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Abstract
In the current age of commercial and financial openness, remote and poor local
economies are becoming increasingly exposed to inflows of external capital. The
new investors - enjoying lower credit constraints than local dwellers - might play a
propulsive role in local development. At the same time, inflows of external capital
can have negative impacts on local natural resource-dependent activities. We
analyze a two-sector model where both sectors damage the environment, but only
that of domestic producers relies on natural resources. We assess under which
conditions the coexistence of the two sectors is compatible with sustainability,
defined as convergence to a stationary state characterized by a positive stock of
the natural resource. Moreover, we find that capital inflows can be stimulated by an
increase in the pollution intensity of incoming activities, but also in the pollution
intensity of the domestic sector; in both cases, capital inflows generate
environmental degradation and a decrease in welfare for the local population.
Finally, we show that a reduction in the cost of capital for external investors and the
consequent capital inflows have the effect to increase wages, local investments
and welfare of the local populations only if the environmental impact of the external
sector is relatively low with respect to that of local activities. Otherwise, an
unexpected scenario characterized by a reduction in domestic capital accumulation
and the impoverishment of local agents can occur.
Introduction
In poor economies, foreign direct investments (FDI) are seen by policy makers as
a possible solution to tackle the scarcity of domestic capitals and to escape a
poverty trap of low investments, low growth and the perpetuation of poverty. The
arrival of external investors is usually considered to be beneficial for economic
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expansion and for the diversification of local economies. Many governments offer
significant inducements to attract FDI. [1] calculates that 2078 out of 2267
national policy changes, introduced around the world between 1992 and 2005,
were favorable to FDI. A vast part of the economic literature regards FDI inflows
as positive drivers of economic development in recipient countries since they can
generate spill-over effects on local firms through diffusion of technology and more
advanced management practices ([2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]) or since they may
foster the creation of employment, development of infrastructure, expansion of
the tax base, and the collection of fiscal revenues ([9], [10], [11]). Other studies
focus on the conditions required to produce these positive effects ([12], [13], [14],
[15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23]). Less attention has been
dedicated to the potentially negative impacts of external capital investments
notwithstanding the findings of some authors that in certain developing countries
foreign investments can harm or crowd-out local firms or have negative effects on
economic growth in the short term ([24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31],
[32]).
Overall, the empirical evidence on the impact of FDI on local development and
local firms, is still mixed ([20], [33]). At the same time, the ongoing and
numerous episodes of environmental-related protests by local populations against
large foreign or national investment projects all over the world suggest that
negative interactions between natural resource dependent activities and large
investors may be both significant and severe. The information gathered in the
Environmental Justice Atlas (EJ Atlas), for istance is emblematic. The EJ Atlas is a
global database created within the Environmental Justice Organisations, Liabilities
and Trade (EJOLT) project that monitors and collects data on environmental
conflicts, namely mobilizations by local communities or social movements against
particular economic activities, in which environmental impacts are a key element
of their grievances. Though the platform does not cover all geographic areas, it has
already recorded 1122 cases of ecological distribution conflicts. Increasing
material demand (land, water, mineral ores, biomass), waste creation and
industrial production seem to feed a growing climate of protests by communities
trying to defend their livelihoods from damaging environmental impacts. The
databases collects stories of extractive projects, mega dams, large transport
infrastructures, toxic waste, dump sites, energy and power plants, large-scale land
acquisitions, pollution due to manufacturing. China provides some of the most
symbolic examples of rural communities harmed by the arrival of new
manufacturing firms. In February 2012, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao said that: ‘‘
Water pollution is mainly resulting from industrial and sewage waste water and is
now in very serious situation.’’ (reported in Greenpeace International, 2012). Li
Yang, Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said in February
2013 that ‘‘ China’s real economic growth rate would only be around 5%, if
economic losses caused by ecological degradation and environmental damage are
subtracted from the overall GDP’’ (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/
2013-02/28/c_132312932.htm). Recent evidence suggests that global extraction of
natural resources from ecosystem has increased consistently over the last forty
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years despite a considerable decline in the material intensity of production [34];
the dematerialization of production in rich countries is also explained by growing
material imports from abroad. [35] using a global input–output database (Eora
MRIO database) find that developed countries import water embodied in goods
from the rest of the world to reduce pressure on domestic water resources.
Similarly, the time series analysis of material requirements for consumption
(material footprint) of 186 countries by [36] suggests that as advanced economies
become richer, they are able to increase their material consumption while at the
same time reducing their extraction of domestic materials through international
trade. The indirect impact of this transition is a growing absorption of
environmentally intensive activities by lower income countries.
All these factors suggest that the development process of today’s less developed
countries cannot be viewed in isolation from the environmental pressures exerted
by external forces. This paper contributes to the debate on the relationship
between external investments, poverty reduction and sustainability by discussing
how this link is affected by the environmental attributes of the recipient economy,
in the form of initial endowments of natural capital and environmental carrying
capacity, and the pollution intensity of economic activities. We assume that
foreign and local firms are heterogeneous. First, they are characterized by different
production functions, that is, they belong to different sectors and they are not
competitors. Only the local sector relies on natural resources. Second, the law of
motion of physical capital differs between the two sectors due to capital market
imperfections. We reckon that this is an important extension as many rural
economic activities in developing countries are characterized by dependence on
environmental resources and barriers to credit markets ([37], [38]). At the same
time, for the sake of clarity and analytical convenience, we exclude some of the
positive channels of transmission that have been studied by FDI literature such as
inward or forward linkages, knowledge spillovers, and increased access to
international market networks. However, some potential positive impacts of FDI
are embodied in the model. Capital inflows create new labor opportunities and
raise labor demand. This, in turn, increases wage labor remuneration in the
external sectors and the resulting growth in the revenues of local workers expands
their savings and their capacity to invest. In other words, we assume that in the
economy under study, where economic agents can invest only to the extent they
save, revenues generated from FDI can foster the domestic accumulation of
physical capital.
Model and Methods
Let us consider a simplified economy where prices are exogenous and there are
three factors of production: labor, a renewable natural resource and physical
capital. The agents are divided in two population groups: ‘‘ External Investors’’ (I-
agents) and ‘‘ Local Agents’’ (L-agents). The I-agents are endowed with physical
capital which can be invested in the economy in question or elsewhere. We
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assume that they do not face credit constraints and their availability of physical
capital is ‘‘ unlimited’’. Therefore they will continue to invest their capital in the
economy as long as the return on capital generated is higher than in other
economies. I-agents also employ wage labor and undertake all their potential work
- represented by a fixed amount of entrepreneurial activity - in what we call the ‘‘
external sector’’. The main asset of the L-agents is labor force and they have to
choose how to distribute this asset between two activities: wage work for External
Investors in the external sector or direct exploitation of the natural resource. Let
us say that ‘‘ local sector’’ denotes production of the Local Agents. Their activities
can be represented by natural resource harvesting, fisheries, forestry or tourism.
Given that L- and I- agents’ investments in physical capital follow different
mechanisms and rules, we assume that the capital market is completely segmented
and that it is accessible only to the External Investors, while the Local Agents can
only invest their savings.
We assume that the production functions of the two sectors satisfy the Inada
conditions, are concave, increasing and homogenous of degree 1 in their inputs.






E is the stock of a free access environmental resource;
L is the amount of time the representative L-agent spends on local sector
production;
KL is the physical capital accumulated by the representative L-agent;
aw0, bw0, azbv1 hold.
The L-agent’s total amount of time is normalized to 1 and leisure is excluded,
thus 1{L represents the L-agent’s labor when employed by the representative I-
agent in wage work. The production function of the representative External





where KI denotes the stock of physical capital invested in the economy by the
representative I-agent. The I-agents choose their labor demand 1{L and the stock
of physical capital KI which they invest in the economy in order to maximize their
profits:
YI{w(1{L){rKI
where w and r are, respectively, the wage and the interest rate, considered as
exogenously determined by each I-agent. However, the wage w is endogenously
set in the economy by the labor market equilibrium condition (we rule out the
importation of labor from other economies), while r is an exogenous parameter.
We assume that the KI inflow is potentially unlimited. Therefore the dynamics of
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KI are not linked to the I-agents’ savings but only to the productivity of KI (which,
in turn, depends on L and KI). The local agents can choose the level of their
savings and the allocation of their labor between the two sectors. We assume that













where the positive parameter d represents the discount subjective rate and K
:
L is
the time derivative dKL=dt of the variable KL. The representative local agent
invests her remaining savings after financing her consumption CL in physical
capital. Her resources come from self-employment in the local sector
(KaLE
bL1{a{b) and from wage labor in the external sector ((1{L)w). To simplify,
we have assumed that the prices of the goods produced in the local and in the
external sectors are both equal to unity; the wage w is expressed in terms of the
external sector output.
We assume that both populations are made up of a continuum of identical
individuals and the size of each community is equal to 1. The dynamics of E are





YL and YI are the aggregate values of YL and YI respectively and E and g are
positive parameters measuring the environmental impact caused by the aggregate
production of L and I-agents respectively. The expression E(E{E) represents an
inverted-U-shaped function commonly used to describe the dynamics of a
renewable environmental resource without human impact. According to this, the
stock E of the natural resource grows at a positive but declining rate until it
reaches the maximum sustainable value E; the positive parameter E represents the
carrying capacity of the environmental resource. In our model, this function is
modified by adding the negative impacts caused by the production of the two
sectors, which is assumed to be proportional to the aggregate production levels YL
and YI .
This assumption is usual in models with economic activities depending on
open-access resources (see, for example, [39], [40]) or with polluting industries
([41], [42]).
Problem (2) will be analyzed with the following restrictions on variables and
parameters: KL, Ew0; a, b, c, d, E, g, r, Ew0; azbv1.
Each economic agent considers the effect of her choices on the dynamics of E to
be negligible and does not internalize it. That is, YL and YI are considered to be
exogenous, which implies that the evolution of E is taken as given in problem (2).
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As a result, the economic agents behave without taking into account of the
shadow value of the natural resource and nobody invests to restore the natural
capital. Working under the assumption that each typology of agents consists of a
continuum of identical individuals of size 1, (ex post) aggregate outputs YL and
YI coincide with per-capita values YL and YI , respectively.
This is obviously a stylized scenario, but it reflects some of the main differences
between local and foreign firms in rural poor areas. Poor local producers usually
adopt labor intensive techniques, use unpaid family work, and face strong
constraints in their access to credit markets. In contrast, external investors are able
to finance their activities by borrowing from the capital markets, hire workers,
and adopt capital-intensive techniques. Their ability to accumulate physical
capital is typically in no way comparable to that of the local population. Local and
external agents also differ in terms of defensive strategies. External investors can
react to a reduction in the return on physical capital by moving to other
economies. Local producers, on the other hand, cannot displace their economic
activities and can only defend themselves from the reduced productivity of the
assets used in their activities, natural and physical capital, by modifying the
allocation of their fixed amount of labor across sectors and by choosing the level
of their savings under a strict budget constraint.
Dynamics
The dynamics generated by the model are derived in S1 File by applying the
Maximum Principle to the maximization problem (2) of the representative L-
agent, under the condition of labor market equilibrium. According to the results



















identifies the labor market equilibrium value L of L if the right side of (3) is lower







The economy is specialized in the production of the L-sector if L~1. Its
specialization in the production of the external sector is excluded (that is, Lw0
always holds). Therefore two cases can occur: the case without specialization (in
the local sector) and the case with specialization. It is worth observing that the
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external sector never completely replaces the local sector, since the productivity of
labor employed in local activities tends to infinity as the workers move away from
this sector. In contrast, the economy can fully specialize in the local sector
although the productivity of labor in the external sector also tends to infinity as
(1{L)?0. In this case, in fact, external investors withdraw their capitals from the
economy and reduce KI , which eventually goes to zero, in that labor becomes
increasingly expensive.
Dynamics without specialization
If KL and E are such that C KaLE
b
  1
azbv1 (see (4)), then L-agents spend a positive
fraction of their time endowment working in the external sector and equation (3)
identifies the equilibrium value of L. Moreover, the following proposition holds:







Prof: See S1 File.
The equilibrium wage rate is completely determined by the elasticity with
respect to labor of production in the external sector (c) and by the capital cost (r).
A change in any other parameter does not affect the equilibrium wage even if it
leads to a variation in the equilibrium values of L, KI and of E. We will return later
on the implications of this result.
In this context, the dynamics obtained by applying the Maximum Principle to





















































where l is the co-state variable associated to the state variable KL, which is usually





azb§1, then the L-agents spend all their time endowment working in
the L-sector, that is L~1, and the dynamic system obtained by applying the
Maximum Principle to problem (2) is:
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Stationary states of dynamics
A stationary state P~(E, KL , l







~0. From equation l
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~0, in the case without
















Consequently, Lv1 if and only if KLvad{1C{a{b. This implies that the




It is easy to check that, below the straight line KL~KL, the stationary states
(without specialization) are given by the intersections between the two following
curves:
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Notice that Vw0 always while:




The existence and stability properties of the stationary states without
specialization pivot on the sign of the parameter L which indicates whether
shifting the labor force from one sector to the other results in an increase or in a
decrease of the environmental impact. In particular, according to (14), Lw0
holds if the ratio between E (measuring the environmental impact of the local
sector) and g (measuring the environmental impact of the external sector) is lower
than the ratio between the labor elasticities, 1{a{b and 1{c, of the production
functions in the local sector and in the external sector, respectively.
Above KL~KL, the stationary states with specialization (system (6)) are given












The following propositions deal with the problem of the existence and numerosity
of the stationary states of the dynamics (5)–(6).
Proposition 2: The dynamic system (5)–(6) admits at most four stationary states:
A and B with Lv1, A1 and B1 with L~1.
Proof: The graph of g(E) is a parabola while the graph of f (E) is a straight line,
consequently f (E) and g(E) have at most two intersections. In the same way, both
















has at most two zeros with Ew0.
The symbol A1 (respectively, B1) shall refer to the stationary state
P~(E,KL ,l
) with specialization satisfying the condition f ’1(E
)vg’1(E)
(respectively, f ’1(E
)wg’1(E)); in the same way, the symbol A (respectively, B)
shall refer to the stationary state without specialization satisfying the condition
sign Lð Þ~sign f ’(E){g’(E)½  (respectively, sign Lð Þ~sign g’(E){f ’(E)½ ).
To express the next proposition, we have to define the following threshold
values:
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Proposition 3: The stationary states of the dynamic system (5)–(6) are (see
Fig. 1):
1) A, B, A1, B1 if and only if (iff):
gvgT , EwET , maxfE1(E,g),E3(E)gvEvE2(E)
2) A and B iff:
gvgT , EvET , E1(E,g)vEvE2(E)
or
gvgT , EwET , E1(E,g)vEvE3(E)
3) A1 and B1 iff:
gvgT , EwET , E3(E)vEvE1(E,g)
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or
gwgT , EwET , E3(E)vEvE2(E)
4) A and B1 iff:
EwE2(E)
No stationary state exists in the remaining cases.
Proof: See S1 File.
In the above classification, for the sake simplicity, we do not take into account ‘‘
non robust’’ cases corresponding to an equality condition of parameter values (for
example, the cases in which g~gT , E~ET or E~E3(E)).
Fig. 2 shows a numerical example in which four stationary states exist: A, B, A1
and B1.
Let P~ E,KL ,l
  be a stationary state of the dynamics (5)–(6). The stability
properties of P depend on the signs of the real parts of the eigenvalues associated
to the Jacobian matrix J evaluated at P. We shall say that P is saddle-point stable
if J has two eigenvalues with negative real parts, i.e. if P has a 2-dimensional
stable manifold. As a matter of fact, under the perfect foresight assumption, when
the stationary state P has a 2-dimensional stable manifold, if the initial values
E(0) and KL(0) are near enough to E and KL , L-agents are able to fix the initial
value l(0) of the (jumping) co-state variable l so that the growth trajectory
starting from (E(0),KL(0),l(0)) approaches P. Therefore the stationary state can
be reached by growth trajectories. If J has less than two eigenvalues with negative
real parts, then given the initial values E(0) and KL(0), a value l(0) does not
(generically) exist so that the growth trajectory starting from (KL(0),E(0),l(0))
approaches the stationary state.
The following propositions concern the stability properties of the stationary
states A1 and B1, in the regime with specialization (i.e. L~1), and the states A
and B, in the regime without specialization (i.e. Lv1). Numerical example in
which four stationary states exist; the values of parameters are: a~0:25, b~0:35,
c~0:15, d~0:01, E~2, g~0:1, r~0:01, E~6:2.
Proposition 4: In the regime with specialization, we have that: 1) If
f ’1(E
)vg’1(E) (that is, P is of the type A1), then P has two eigenvalues with
strictly positive real parts and one with strictly negative real part; 2) If
f ’1(E
)wg’1(E) (that is, P is of the type B1), then P is saddle-point stable or it has







Proof: See S1 File.
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The following proposition deals with the stability properties of the stationary
states A and B in the regime without specialization (i.e. Lv1).
Proposition 5: In the regime without specialization, we have that: 1) If
sign Lð Þ~sign f ’(E){g’(E)½  (that is, P is of the type A), then P has two
eigenvalues with strictly positive real parts and one with strictly negative real part. 2)
If sign Lð Þ~sign g’(E){f ’(E)½  (that is, P is of the type B), then P is saddle-point
Fig. 1. Threshold values in the plane (E, E) and existing stationary states.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114703.g001
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stable or it has three eigenvalues with strictly positive real parts; a sufficient condition






Proof: See S1 File.
Remember that the parameter E represents the carrying capacity of the
environmental resource E while the parameters E and g measure the
environmental impact caused by the aggregate production of L-agents and I-
agents, respectively. Fig. 1 shows the regions, in the plane (E,E), corresponding to
cases 1-4 of Proposition 3.
Joining together the results concerning the existence and the stability of the
stationary states, we can observe that:
1. A bistable regime (case 1 of Proposition 3, where all the stationary states A, B,
A1, B1 exist) can be observed only for low enough values of g (i.e. gvgT) and
high enough values of E (i.e. EwET), see Fig. 1(a); furthermore, the carrying
capacity E must lie between maxfE1(E,g),E3(E)g and E2(E). In this context, the
dynamics are path dependent: if the economy starts near enough to B
(respectively, to B1), then the stationary state B (respectively, B1) is reached.
2. A necessary condition for the existence of a stationary state of type B is gvgT
(see Fig. 1(a)). In this case, both the local and external sectors can coexist in a
stationary state. If the external sector produces a devastating environmental
effect (i.e. gwgT), then the expansion of the external sector generates an
increase in environmental degradation which, in turn, fuels a further
expansion of the external sector. This self-enforcing mechanism is incompa-
tible with the sustainable coexistence of the two sectors. Furthermore, the
stationary state of type B does not exist if (ceteris paribus) the carrying
capacity E is high enough; in this a case, only the stationary states A and B1
exist (see Figs. 1(a)-1(c)). The coexistence of the two sectors can be observed
only if (see Fig. 1(a)) E is neither ‘‘ too low’’ nor ‘‘ too high’’ (i.e.
E3(E)vEvE2(E)).
3. When B and B1 do not simultaneously exist, then at most one saddle-point
stable stationary state can exist. In particular, only B exists if the conditions
expressed in case 2 of Proposition 3 hold while only B1 exists in the context of
cases 3 and 4 of Proposition 3.
Local agents’ welfare at the stationary states
The following propositions help identify the most significant conditions that are
verified in correspondence with the stationary states of dynamic system (5)–(6);
the asterisk indicates the stationary state values of the variables.
Proposition 6: The following conditions hold at the stationary states of the
dynamic system (5)–(6):
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Proof: See S1 File.
Notice that the values of CL given by the formulas (25) and (26) coincide for
KL~KL :~ad
{1C{a{b.






(see Proposition 1), namely the return to employment in





KL which positively depends on the physical
Fig. 2. Numerical example in which four stationary states exist; the values of parameters are: a~0:21,
b~0:35, ª~0:15, d~0:01, E~6, g~0:1, r~0:01, E~10:5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114703.g002
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capital accumulated by local agents at the stationary state. Variations in
parameters c and r, which cause an increase in the wage rate, can also rise the
welfare of local agents to the extent that the possible negative impact on KL is
limited. In this case, the crowding-out of the local sector is welfare-improving,
otherwise the local population might experience a welfare loss even with increased
wages.
Notice also that the value of KL, evaluated at the stationary state B1, is higher
than that evaluated at B (when both B1 and B simultaneously exist) because B1 lies
above the line (see (9)) KL~KL :~ad
{1C{a{b while B lies below it (see Fig. 2).
Furthermore, also the value of E in B1 is higher than in B; therefore, it is easy to
check the following proposition:
Proposition 7: When the stationary states B1 and B coexist, then L-agents’ welfare
(measured by CL), evaluated in B1, is higher than that evaluated in B.
We do not consider the stationary states A1 and A because they cannot be
saddle-point stable.
Proposition 7 entails that, in a bistable regime, economies characterized by low
initial values of E and KL (see Fig. 2) are more likely to converge to the Pareto-
dominated stationary state without specialization than richer economies, which
can rely on greater values of E(0) and KL(0) and, therefore, are located closer to
the stationary state B1.
Comparative statics
The following propositions investigate the impact of a change in parameters (in




and CL evaluated at B, the stationary state without specialization that can be
saddle-point stable. The symbols x: and x; indicate, respectively, an increase and
a decrease in the parameter or variable x. We carry out some exercises in
comparative statics in B in order to assess the impact of various changes in
parameters in an economy that can converge to a stationary state with two sectors,
namely in a context where inflows of external capital are admissible and, in
principle, do not threaten sustainability. Figs. 3 and 4 show a graphical
representation of the results by some numerical exercises.
Proposition 8: E: (remember that E represents the carrying capacity of the
environmental resource) implies E:, KL:, L
:, CL: and K

I ;
Proof: See S1 File.
Proposition 9: E: or g: (remember that E and g represent, respectively, the
environmental impact of the local sector and of the external one) imply E;, KL;,
L;, CL; and K

I :
Proof: See S1 File.
These results show that an increase in the value of E or g tends to stimulate a
movement of labor towards the external sector, whose productive performance is
not damaged by environmental degradation. The local community faces a
reduction in the return to self-employed labor and is pushed towards wage
employment. In this context, the expansion of external capital inflows does not
Rural Poor Economies in Front of Foreign Investors
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help local agents. On the contrary, their welfare declines (i.e. CL;). This outcome
comes out even if the labor market is perfectly competitive and is not segmented,
that is a context where a rise in external investor’s demand for domestic labor
produces a pattern of labor reallocation that should raise wages in both sectors.
The introduction of environmental externalities, on the other hand, mitigates this
channel of transmission resulting in an expansion of the external sector’s output
share with constant wages and a decrease in local agents’ welfare. Indeed, as
reported in Proposition 1, the equilibrium wage rate is constant and is not
affected by variations in parameters E and g.
A symmetrically opposite effect is produced by an increase in E, which
translates into an increase in the welfare of L-agents and a reduction in the
investments of I-agents. In this context, therefore, an abundance of natural capital
is a blessing for local economy expansion.
The following proposition considers the effects of a change in the value of the
parameter r, that is, a change in external agents’ cost of capital investment in the
economy.
Proposition 10: If Lw0 (i.e. EvEL ; see (14) and Fig. 1(a)), then r: always

































Furthermore, (27) is a sufficient condition to have KL:.
Proof: See S1 File.
According to (14), condition EvEL can be rewritten as E=gv(1{a{b)=(1{c),
which requires (ceteris paribus) a low enough ratio between the negative
environmental impact of the local sector (measured by E) and of the external
sector (measured by g).
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Remember that, according to Proposition 6, KL is positively correlated with L

















This implies that the condition
LKL
Lr
w0 is necessary but not sufficient to obtain
LCL
Lr
w0. Our results (see Proposition 3 and formula (29)) predict that a reduction
in r surely generates an increase in CL only if
LKL
Lr
v0; this happens when, in the
context Lv0 (i.e. EwEL), the opposite of condition (28) holds. In fact, in this
case, according to formula (29),
LCL
Lr
v0 holds and so a decline in the opportunity
cost of capital for the external investors leads to an increase in KL and in C

L.
Fig. 3. Values of K L , K

I , E
, L, Y I and C

L evaluated at B, varying the parameters E, E and g; the other parameters are fixed at the values: a~0:1,
b~0:35, ª~0:2, d~0:01, r~0:01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114703.g003
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Remember that the condition Lv0 requires (ceteris paribus) a relatively low
environmental impact of the external sector in comparison to that of the local
activities (see (14)). In the context Lv0, external capital inflows, which attract
the labor force towards the external sector, alleviate pressure on natural resources
because the local population has the opportunity to rely more on cleaner
activities. In all other cases, a decline in r can have the effect of reducing local
agents’ welfare. Inflows of external capitals can still have a positive effect even
when Lw0, that is when external activities are relatively more polluting than local
ones and their expansion is associated with a negative net impact on natural
resources. Figs. 4(a) and 4(c), for instance, show two examples with Lw0 which
differ only in the value of g. With a sufficiently low g, a decrease in r leads to a
growth in CL though it causes also a decline in E. With high values of g, however,
the opposite is true and external investments have a detrimental effect on both the
local agents’ welfare and the environment. This result indicates that external
Fig. 4. Values of K L , K

I , E
, L, Y I and C

L evaluated at B, varying the parameter r; the other parameters are fixed at the values: a~0:1, b~0:35,
ª~0:2, d~0:01, E~5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114703.g004
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capital inflows, might not only fail to trigger net positive effects, but may also
produce a net negative impact on local welfare even if they stimulate labor
demand.
Results and Discussion
This section gathers together and summarizes the main findings of our analysis.
We have studied an economy exposed to environmental externalities and open to
external investors with better access to the capital market than local producers. In
this context, we find that:
1. The following three main contexts can be considered (see Figs. 1(a)–1(c)):
N (a) If the carrying capacity (measured by the parameter E) of the
environment is very low, a stationary state with a positive value of the
stock of the environmental resource does not exist; this implies that the
economy cannot follow a path of sustainable development, that is a path
along which the stock of the environmental resource is not completely
exhausted.
N (b) If the carrying capacity of the environmental resource is very high, the
economy converges to a stationary state with complete specialization in
the local sector (stationary state B1).
N (c) If the carrying capacity of the environmental resource is neither too high
nor too low compared to the environmental impact of the local sector
(measured by the parameter E), two dynamic regimes can emerge: the
context in which the environmental impact of the external sector
(measured by the parameter g) surpasses a threshold level specified in the
analysis (i.e. gwgT) or that in which it remains below this threshold level
(i.e. gvgT):
N (i) In the former case (illustrated in Figs. 1(b)–1(c)), the economy can
only converge to a stationary state (B1) with full specialization in the
local sector. Therefore, the coexistence between the local and external
sectors cannot be observed in a non-transient way in that the
environmental impact of the external sector is too high.
N (ii) In the second context (represented in Fig. 1(a)), in which the
intensity of the environmental impact produced by the external
sector is low, at most four stationary states (A, B, A1 and B1) exist
and at most two of them (B and B1) can be achieved by the
economy. In this context, a bistable regime can be observed: the
economy converges to the stationary state (B) where the local and
the external sectors coexist in a non transient way, or it progressively
specializes in the local sector (i.e. it converges to B1) and the external
sector is pushed out.
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2. In the bistable scenarios described above, the selection between the two
reachable stationary states depends on initial conditions ((E(0) and KL(0)).
Economies starting with deteriorated environment ((E(0) low) and low stock
of domestic physical capital (KL(0) low) tend to attract external investments
and to converge to a stationary state involving the coexistence of local and
external activities (the state B). Economies characterized by higher initial
endowments of domestic capital and natural resources are more likely to
completely specialize in the local sector production (that is, to converge to the
state B1). The equilibrium value of local agents’ welfare is higher in these
latter economies than in those with poorer initial environmental or capital
endowments which converge to a stationary state of economic diversification
(i.e. with the coexistence of the external and domestic sectors). These findings
are consistent with the notion that if nature’s bounty is sufficiently large and
well-preserved and the economy starts from a sizeable initial endowment of
physical capital, the mobilization of domestic resources is preferable to a
development path fed by external capitals.
3. If the economy converges to the stationary state characterized by the non
transient and sustainable coexistence of both sectors (the stationary state B),
exogenous variations in the parameters’ values may affect the equilibrium
values of the variables in the model. In particular:
N (a) An (exogenous) rise in the intensity of environmental pressure of
productive activities (that is, an exogenous rise in the values of
parameters E and g) always leads to an increase in external investment,
and to a reduction in the stock of the natural resource and local agents’
capital accumulation and consumption, though the equilibrium wage
rate is not affected. Indeed, if the interest rate and physical capital
elasticity of the external sectors do not vary, international capital mobility
results in constant equilibrium wages. In other words, a rise in the
environmental impact of economic activities leads to a reduction in
natural capital pushing part of the labor force to the external sector,
depressing the accumulation capacity of local producers and, conse-
quently, encouraging external capital inflows. The same effects are
generated by an exogenous reduction in the carrying capacity of the
natural resource (that is, a reduction in the value of the parameter E).
N (b) A decline in external investors’ cost of capital in the economy (represented
by the parameter r) generates an increase in the external investment and a
rise in the equilibrium wage. However, local agents’ welfare (measured by
the consumption level CL) increases only if the external sector has a
sufficiently low negative impact on the natural resource compared with
the environmental pressure exerted by the local sector. Otherwise,
scenarios characterized by an increase in external capital inflows
accompanied by decreasing welfare for the local population cannot be
ruled out. More precisely, if the incoming activities are very polluting, the
model can generate a paradox of increased wages and rise in external
Rural Poor Economies in Front of Foreign Investors
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0114703 December 15, 2014 20 / 24
capital flows associated with declining local welfare. In this case, the
environmental impact of external capitals is so devasting that the new
external investments generate an increase in labor demand and the
remuneration of wage labor which are offset by their negative impact on
labor productivity in the local sector. Incoming capital flows crowd out
the local sector and do not produce a sufficient expansion of labor
demand.
4. Local population’s consumption when the economy converges to a state with
the coexistence of the two sectors (the stationary state B) can be either
positively or negatively correlated with the dynamics of natural capital and
physical capital invested by external agents. The sign of this relationship
depends on the factor causing the change. If the trigger factor is a variation in
the carrying capacity of the environment or in the degree of environmental
pressure generated by either local or external production activities, local
welfare is positively correlated with the stock of natural capital and negatively
correlated with the stock of external investments. If the trigger factor is a
change in the cost of capital for external investors (measured by the
parameter r, which may be also interpreted as the external agents’
opportunity cost of the investment in the economy in question), then the
local population’s welfare is positively associated with inward external capitals
only if the external sector does not pollute too heavily. In other words, an
improvement in the investment climate conditions for external investors (that
is, a reduction in r) is not necessarily beneficial for the host economy. In fact,
it is only certain to have a positive impact on local agents’ welfare if the
pollution intensity of the activities in which incoming capital inflows are
employed is relatively lower than that of local activities. In this scenario, the
external capitals feed an increase in wages which in turn helps the capital
accumulation of local producers. The arrival of external capitals promotes the
mobilization of local accumulation potential. In all other cases, instead,
capital inflows may reduce local agents’ welfare.
An improved investment climate is one of the main objectives of most local and
national governments all over the world. The promotion of incentives and of
opportunities for firms to invest and to create jobs is regarded as a crucial strategy
in order to stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty. The economic
doctrine has underscored the need both to mobilize domestic resources and to
attract external capitals and several international organizations have suggested
measures for promoting domestic investments and improving investment climate.
The World Development Report 2005, for example, points out that investment
climate improvements are driving factors in boosting economic expansion and
combating poverty, recommending the promotion of domestic investments and
support of small and rural firms [43]. In poor economies, inflows of external
investments are seen by policy makers as the main solution to tackle the scarcity of
domestic capitals and to escape a poverty trap of low investments - low growth -
perpetual poverty. The expansion of new and non resource-based activities,
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prompted by the arrival of external investors, is considered to be the way forward
in terms of economic expansion and diversification of the local economy. Many
countries, therefore, have focused their efforts on reforms and inducements aimed
at promoting big modern companies, which are usually financed by external
capitals. The model proposed has enabled us to discuss the effects of economic
diversification in an economy dependent on free access natural resources. The
model shows that the conditions for economic development and poverty
reduction become stricter when environmental dynamics are included in the
debate on the interaction between local and external producers. In particular, the
increasing exposure of local economies to external forces and investments can
cause negative consequences. This occurs when incoming actors invest in
contaminating industries and enter economies characterized by high dependence
on primary activities and, consequently, by an acute vulnerability to environ-
mental degradation or to exclusion from the use of natural resources.
However, these conclusions, need to be evaluated taking into account that
positive externalities and backward or forward linkages between the two sectors
are excluded from our model. The inclusion of these channels of interaction
between the two sectors may, in fact, limit or downsize the results obtained by this
model. Our objective, in any case, was to focus on factors that tend to be neglected
in the discussion of investment incentives, namely the environmental externalities
of human activities and agents’ heterogeneity in terms of their vulnerability to
depletion of natural resources and access to capital markets.
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